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Abstract—Process mining reveals how processes in organisa-
tions are actually performed and pinpoints deviations from the
desired process execution. Process delay is one type of deviation
that can be detected. Specific activities may take longer than
expected or the waiting times between activities may deviate from
service agreements. However, the quantification of processing
or waiting times is often only the starting point in identifying
the underlying root causes for process delay. One such root
cause are adverse incidents in the environment of the process
such as malfunctioning of supporting systems or unavailability
of resources. Data about these external factors is often neither
included in the event log nor recorded precisely enough to
be directly linkable to a specific set of process instances. This
paper presents a method for estimating process delay caused
by incidents for which only the approximate occurrence time is
known. We link incidents that are recorded in an incident log to
process delay and calculate the effect of incidents on process delay
using a Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling (MCMC) approach.
Our proposed method was evaluated in a project conducted with
the infrastructure manager of the Norwegian railway system.
We applied it to a large event log of more than 120 million
events capturing block-level movements of trains in the railway
network and estimated the impact on process delay of about 50
000 infrastructure-related incidents. This showed that the method
is useful for providing decision support and insights on the effects
of maintenance. Since then the method has become part of the
standard toolbox of the infrastructure manager.
I. INTRODUCTION
While a process can be viewed as a sequence of events,
with timings and ordering, that can be investigated with
process mining methods [1]; in most processes it is also
fruitful to discuss factors that negatively impact the process
execution. These are often colloquially referred to as adverse
events. These events are not necessarily a part of the process,
but occurrences that directly or indirectly affect activities of
a process. Statistical process control generally distinguishes
between common-cause variations and special-cause variations
[2], which correspond well to internal and external factors.
Common-cause variations, often internal to the process, are
events caused by phenomena constantly active within a system,
they can be probabilistically predicted, or simply seen as the
natural variation or noise within a system. Typical common-
cause variations are variable process performance due to
capacity problems or difference process variants. Special-cause
variations, often external to the system, are unpredictable and,
even when internally sourced, variations outside the historical
evidence base. Concrete examples are power outages, extreme
weather conditions, etc. The latter source of delay often has
an indirect causal connection with the execution of process
activities. Therefore, the attribution of delay (or establishing
a more direct cause-and-effect relation) in which the special-
cause variation is isolated from the common-cause variation
is often tricky.
We address the problem of estimating the impact of in-
cidents on the performance of a process (special-cause vari-
ations) based on an event log, as well as a separate, non-
integrated, incident log. The event log stores the process
execution in terms of activity sequences and their timestamps
as usually assumed in process mining. The incident log is a
supplementary data source storing information on the occur-
rence of incidents with a possible influence on the process.
Such incident logs, however, are likely not to contain precise
information on the exact boundaries of an incident’s influence
on the process. Often, incidents are manually recorded after
the fact or the exact time boundaries of their influence on the
process are unknown.
Our contribution is an estimation method for process delay
caused by external incidents. First, our method quantifies
process delay based on comparing process performance to the
typical performance as observed before and after the incident
in an event log. Then, it connects this delay to an incident
based on a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation
of the time window in which the incident influenced the
process performance. The proposed method was evaluated in
depth using a large event log obtained from railway traffic in
the Norwegian railway network and corresponding incidents
from a maintenance management system. In this scenario,
estimation of process delay is necessary as the maintenance
system contains only unreliable information on the exact
occurrence time frame of incidents making it impossible to
directly link the incidents to delay in the process.
This remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II expands on our motivation to study the delay estimation
problem and illustrates it using a railway network process
scenario; Section III presents the process delay estimation
method; and Section IV describes the evaluation. Finally,
Section VI concludes with an outlook on future work.
II. MOTIVATION
Figure 1 illustrates the process delay estimation challenge.
Often the execution of a process is logged in an event log. This
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Fig. 1. Incidents affect the process execution and may cause process delay,
which can be measured from the event log of a process. Incidents are also
logged in an incident log, but cannot be directly linked to the events due to
imprecise recording of the exact boundaries of an incident.
allows us to measure the performance of individual process
instances or even specific process activities. By comparing to
the normal process performance or to service agreements it
is possible to measure process delay. Condition monitoring
data provides information on adverse incidents that may affect
the process performance. However, one challenge with such
incident logs is often a weak or non-existent causal relation
to operational performance metrics of the supported process.
Establishing a causal relationship between the condition or
state of physical infrastructure and the performance in use is
impossible without perfect information. The goal of our work
is to estimate this missing link between event log and incident
log and connect individual incidents to the observed process
delay.
We illustrate the problem of process delay estimation using
an example taken from the railway domain in which adverse
incidents on the railway infrastructure delay the block level
movements of trains throughout the railway network. Railways
are, from a statistical process control perspective, a process
only barely in control. Schedules is an idealistic plan, and per-
formance will usually be worse that planned. Hence, running
with delays is the common case. This makes it extra difficult to
determine and attribute additional lapses in performance (e.g.
delays) over the common performance on the instance level.
Common sources for process delays are passenger-related,
operator-related, and infrastructure-related delays. These also
interact through multiple complex pathways. So, the perfect
separation of causality is assumed impossible. Moreover, the
source of delay are interdependent, with several paths of
correlation between them, necessitating an estimation-based
approach to delay-allocation. Note that the estimation method
is not limited to physical infrastructure as adverse incidents
may also affect resources required in more traditional business
processes such as loan applications or call centre handling.
Looking at the railway scenario from a process mining per-
spective, each run of a train through the network is a process
instance and the block-level movement between stations can be
TABLE I
AN EXAMPLE RAILWAY TRAFFIC CONTROL EVENT LOG TAKEN FROM THE
NORWEGIAN RAILWAY NETWORK WHICH IS USED AS INPUT TO OUR
METHOD. TABLE ADAPTED FROM [3].
id train time schedule station track type
e1 407 06:30:43 06:30:00 OPD - arrival
e2 407 06:47:52 06:45:00 OPD OPD-FGH departure
e3 407 06:53:27 06:51:30 FGH OPD-FGH arrival
e4 407 06:53:49 06:52:00 FGH FGH-UBG departure
e5 407 07:02:49 07:00:30 UBG FGH-UBG arrival
e6 407 07:03:25 07:01:00 UBG UBG-BAK departure
e7 407 07:11:19 07:08:00 BAK UBG-BAK arrival
e8 407 07:13:15 07:09:00 BAK - departure
e9 42 09:30:03 09:29:00 BAK - arrival
e10 42 09:31:54 09:30:00 BAK BAK-UBG departure
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE II
AN EXAMPLE INCIDENT LOG TAKEN FROM THE NORWEGIAN RAILWAY
NETWORK WHICH IS USED AS INPUT TO OUR METHOD.
id object location time
i1 EH-MAS-123 km 453 2017-12-04 06:58:00
i2 SA-DRV-123 km 442 2017-12-06 13:23:00
i3 SA-SIK-123 km 320 2017-12-12 20:51:00
. . . . . . . . . . . .
modelled as process activities. In most railway networks, train
movements are recorded in railway traffic control logs such as
the one in Table I. Traffic control logs contain the running time
of trains between stations and the dwelling time on stations.
Based on this data, an event log suitable for measuring process
delay can be built [3], [4]. We consider the movement between
stations (column track) as process activity, which results in
a process as depicted in Figure 2. Activities represent the
movement of trains between stations (or intermediate mea-
surement point) and the time spent between activities (shown
on the edges) is the dwelling time on a station. Then, we can
compute the delay by comparing the actual running time with
the scheduled running time or the average running time in the
past days.
Next to traffic control logs, the railway Infrastructure Man-
ager (IM) manages all infrastructure condition related events
and work orders in a maintenance management system. From
this system an incident log as shown in Table II can be
extracted. Each incident relates to a certain object that can
be associated to a specific track by its location. The time at
which the incident occurred is recorded, but due to manual
registration often it is only an approximation of the actual
time. Specifically, the time boundaries in which the incident
may have had a influence, i.e., from its occurrence until the
incident was resolved, are not recorded or not available with
sufficient quality. Given this data the IM wants to connect
process delay (i.e. late trains) to specific incidents in order to
make informed decision on maintenance investments.
III. DELAY ESTIMATION METHOD
The proposed process delay estimation method infers the
missing link between occurrences of adverse incidents, for
which the exact time boundaries are unknown, and process
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Fig. 2. Process map (directly-follows relations) of a small part of the Norwegian railway network discovered using half a year of traffic control logs for
trains riding from Trondheim towards Oslo when using 90% of the most common traces. Note that on some stations trains do not stop, which explains the
very low time waiting at some station (edges).
delays as measured from an event log. First, we describe the
inputs and assumptions of our method. There are three inputs:
• an event log L of the process,
• a log I of adverse incidents;
• a relation I2A connecting incidents to activities.
An event log L is defined over a set of unique events E and a
set of activities A. It consists of traces s ∈ L that are sequences
of events, i.e., L ⊆ P(E∗) such that each event e ∈ E occurs
in one and only one trace. Each event e ∈ s corresponds to
the occurrence of some distinct activity from a pre-defined set
of activities actE(e) ∈ A together with two timestamps: the
start time of the activity timesE(e) ∈ N and the completion
time of the activity timecE(e) ∈ N. Such event log is also
denoted as activity log as the two standard life-cycle transitions
start and complete are combined in one event. Generally, non-
compliant event logs can be pre-processed in an activity-log
format even in the presence of noise, e.g., by using alignment-
based conformance checking [6]. For convenience, we define
durE(e) ∈ N with durE(e) = timecE(e)−timesE(e) to return
the total duration of an activity execution.
The set of potential adverse incidents I contains all those
incidents which may have an impact on the process execution.
For each incident i ∈ I its time of occurrence: timeI(i) ∈
N is recorded. Note that this recording may have been done
manually and, thus, could be not reliable, e.g., the incident
may actually have occurred before this time.
The incident-activity relation I2A ⊆ I × A connects each
incident to the activity most likely affected by the incident. We
required this relation to avoid spurious delay registration and
focus on activities for which we can assume a likely causal
relation between the incident and the process performance.
Obtaining I2A is not always straightforward, but often it
can be established automatically, e.g., in our railway scenario
we can use available documentation to relate the location
of objects for which an incident is registered to the track
on which the train rides. Similarly, existing process models
used to determine for which activities resource affected by an
incident are required.
Taking this input, our method computes the delay at-
tributable to each incident, i.e., D ⊆ I×Q. We determine the
delay using the following four steps for each incident i ∈ I and
its set of related process activities Ai = {a | (i, a) ∈ I2A(i)}:
1) we estimate the normal performance of the process
activity;
2) we classify process activity instances around the ap-
proximate time of incident into three classes: severely
delayed, delayed, normal;
3) we use MCMC sampling to determine in which time
frame and how likely the process performance was
influenced by the incident;
4) we accumulate the difference between the normal pro-
cess performance and the observed performance for
all process instances executing the activity within the
estimated time frame.
In the next four sections, we describe each step in detail for
a single incident and its related process activity.
A. Estimating the normal process performance
First, we need to determine the normal performance of the
process without influence of an incident. As our definition
of process performance is relative to the activity which is
considered to be connected to the incident through some
causal link (required resource etc.), we primarily consider the
local process performance in terms of the service time of that
activity.
There are several ways to estimate what is considered nor-
mal. We determine the normal process performance based on
the average performance in the time preceding and succeeding
the incident. Our proposal does not make assumptions on
Service Level Agreements (SLA) as we aimed to also identify
the impact of incidents on process delay even when the delay
is within a given SLA. This is important when the delay
estimation is to be used for a process-improvement scenario
since problems need to be identified before a SLA is violated.
Assume that incident i occurred at time µt,i = timeI(i). To
determine the normal performance, we take the average and
standard deviation of the process performance for each activity
a ∈ Ai observed in the time windows [µt,i − tN2, µt,i − tN1]
and [µt,i+tN1, µt,i+tN2]. Moreover, we exclude outliers with
a very high or low duration. For example, in our use case, we
excluded some unusually slow freight trains, which appeared
regardless of incidents.
Given an event log E, its set of traces L, and the process
activity a ∈ Ai of interest. Let Eastd ⊂ E be the set of events
observed in the normal state time window:
Eastd = {e ∈ E | actE(e) = a ∧
(timeE(e) ∈ [µt,i − tN2, µt,i − tN1]
∨ timeE(e) ∈ [µt,i + tN1, µt,i + tN2])}
We compute the average µastd and standard deviation σ
a
std as
usual:
µastd =
∑
e∈Eastd(durE(e))
|Eastd|
(1)
σastd =
√∑
e∈Eastd(durE(e)− µ
a
std)
2
|Eastd| − 1
(2)
There are several considerations to be taken into account
when choosing tN1 and tN2. Parameter tN1, the time distance
from the assumed time of the incident, needs to be large
enough so that the incident cannot possibly have had an
influence. Similarly, tN2 should be large enough so that the
effect of unrelated delays before or after the incident on
the normal process performance estimate is negligible. For
example, in our case we choose tN1 to be 24 hours and tN2
to be three days.
B. Classifying the duration of activity executions
Having determined the normal process performance in a
standard situation, for each activity a ∈ Ai we build a sorted
sequence of events seqiE(a) : A → E∗ from the executions
of activity a, which are recorded in the event log in the time
window [µt,i − tN1, µt,i + tN1] directly around the suspected
time of the incident:
seqiE(a) = 〈e1, . . . , en〉 s.t. ∀1≤j<k≤n(
{ej , ek} ⊂ E ∧
a = actE(ej) = actE(ek) ∧
tj = time
c
E(ej) ∧
tk = time
c
E(ek) ∧
tj < tk ∧
{tj , tk} ⊂ [µt,i − tN1, µt,i + tN1])
Hereafter, we simply refer to this sequence as sa,i, i.e., sa,i =
seqiE(a).
We classify each event e ∈ sa,i into one of three classes:
C = {0, 1, 2} using function γ : E ×A→ C with:
γ(e, a) =
 1, if durE(e) < 1.5σ
a
normal + µ
a
normal
2, otherwise
3, if durE(e) > 3σanormal + µ
a
normal
Class 1 are normal instances in which the execution time is
in the standard range for activity a that was observed before
and after the incident. Class 2 are delayed instances which
considerably longer. Class 3 are severely delayed activity
executions with an unusually long execution time.
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Fig. 3. We assume that the probability for process delay is increased in a
time frame around the approximate time of the incident.
C. Estimating the influence of an incident
Now we have all the ingredients to estimate the influence
on the execution time of process activities. As illustrated in
Figure 3, we denote with tstart and tend the time window in
which incident i had an influence on activities Ai, which we
want to estimate. We will use the notation P (·) for probability
distributions, and assume apriori for each a ∈ Ai that the
probability distribution to register an event ej ∈ sa,i from
event log E at time tj = timecE(t) as being classified
with class γ(a, ej) = cj outside of the influence of the
incident tj < Tstart or tj > Tend has a discrete probability
distribution P0(cj |p0). Conversely, the probability distribution
for an activity execution in which Tstart < tj < Tend is
P1(cj |p1).
Parameters p0 and p1 are case dependant parameters that in-
dicate the probabilities to observe the three different classes of
delay. For example, in our specific case we choose the param-
eters as p0 = (0.94, 0.055, 0.005) and p1 = (0.93, 0.06, 0.01).
In word, we assume apriori that there is a slightly higher prob-
ability to observe delayed or severely delayed events within the
time boundaries in which the incident was influential on the
system. These parameters were in our case tuned by running
several pilot estimations and compare the results to cases
annotated by experts from the Norwegian railway IM.
As an alternative to manual parameter tuning, these param-
eters could also be estimated by assigning a less informative
prior distribution to the parameters pj for j = 0, 1. For
instance using a Dirichlet distribution as in [5]. However, sim-
ulating them along-side the other parameters in the posterior,
would be much more computationally expensive, requiring all
incidents to be considered in one long MCMC run. Therefore,
in this first approach to solving this problem we propose
tuning these parameter values base on problem experience
and a smaller more know data. Or as another alternative
pj for j = 0, 1 could be estimated from a separate dataset
including both incident-free or known incident cases. For other
problems, directly assigning vaguer priors might also be a
possibility that works well, however this approach was not
investigated in this paper but will be subject to further research.
For each sequence sa of events we assign a parameter
IOa = 0, 1 to denote whether or not the sequence of events
related to activity a is not affected by the incident or affected
by the incident, respectively. To this parameter we assign
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Fig. 4. Example of the estimation of the influence of an incident on activity durations of one specific activity. Each dot represents an activity execution, which
is a train running along a certain track. The thick black vertical line depicts the assumed time at which the incident occurred. The horizontal lines show the
estimates of the normal performance µastd, µ
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std, and µ
a
std+3σ
a
std. Our simulation results in the black curve that shows the probability according
to which a certain timestamp was placed between Tstart and Tend. The grey line depicts the factor with which a prolonged activity duration contributes to
the calculated process delay.
apriori the distribution P (IOa) = 0.5 for IOa = 0, 1. For
the start and end times we assume apriori that Tstart, Tend ∼
N(µt,i, σ
2
t ) with Tstart < Tend, where µt,i is the assumed
time of the incident and σt = 4 is a case dependant parameter.
By Bayes theorem the posterior distribution for Tstart and
Tend is
P (Tstart, Tend|E,Ai, IO, p0, p1, µt,i, σt) ∝
I(Tstart < Tend)P (Tstart|µt,i, σt)P (Tend|µt,i, σt)·∏
a∈Ai
P (IOa)
IOj ∏
ej∈sa
[g1(j) + g0(j)]
 ,
where I(·) is the identity function being 1 if the argument is
true and 0 otherwise, and
g1(j) =I(tj ∈ [Tstart, Tend])P1(cj |p1),
g0(j) =(1− I(tj 6∈ [Tstart, Tend]))P0(cj |p0).
In our use case we simulate 20000 iterations
using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithms using
multiple different proposal distributions for Tstart
and Tend and estimate the marginal aposterior
distributions P (Tstart|E,Ai, IO, p0, p1, µt,i, σt) and
P (Tend|E,Ai, IO, p0, p1, µt,i, σt). This gives us an estimation
of the most probable start and end time of the influence that
the incident had on process delay.
D. Attributing process delay to an incident
Figure 4 gives an example of how the proposed estimation
method works for a single activity when being applied to
an event log in which activities instances are the trains
driving between stations. It shows an excerpt of the registered
activity durations obtained from the Norwegian railway IM
for a single activity (i.e., single track) from several process
instances (individual trains). Even though the registered time
for the incident was around 13:30, there was already some
significant delay before that time. The black curve indicates
the probability according to which a certain timestamp was
placed between Tstart and Tend.
The delay for a single event e can be computed by compar-
ing the recorded activity duration to the average duration in a
normal situation, i.e., delaya(e) = durE(e)− µastd. However,
there are several ways to accumulate the individual delay to
the total process delay attributable to the incident. A straight-
forward method is to multiply the delay recorded by event e
with the probability estimate at time timecE(e). We found in
the validation of our case that this often lead to an under-
approximation of delay. Also, in practice a delay is either
caused by an incident or not caused by an incident. Therefore,
directly using the simulation results can be problematic for
interpretability of the results by process stakeholders. Thus,
we adopted the following method.
We fully count the delay for every event for which the
probability estimate is at least 50%, i.e., in at least half
of the simulated samples timecE(e) falls in the window
[Tstart, Tend]. This captures the intuition that in a core time
frame the delay of each activity instance is fully attributed
to the incident. For the remainder of the activity instances,
we add only a fraction of the delay since the influence of the
incident is less obvious. This yields the grey curve in Figure 4
that we obtain by scaling the simulation results with a factor
of 2 and counting all delay caused by events that occur at a
timestamp for which this scaled probability estimate exceeds
1.0 in full. For example, the delay of the process instance 46
is counted fully, whereas the delay for the process instance
336 is discounted with a factor of approximately 0.25.
In summary, we compute the total delay dE(i) ∈ Q for
incident i connected to activities Ai:
dE(i) =
∑
a∈Ai
∑
e∈seqiE(a)
(delaya(e) ·min(1, 2 · pe))
where
pe = P (time
c
E(e) ∈ [Tstart, Tend]|E,Ai, IO, p0, p1, µt,i, σt)
based on the simulation.
We repeat the procedure and obtain the accumulated delay
di for each incident i and build the set D = {(i, d) | i ∈
I ∧ d = dE(i)}.
IV. CASE: NORWEGIAN RAILWAY TRAFFIC
We validated the proposed method using the process of train
traffic in the Norwegian railway network. Our data source is
a large event log from the traffic control system as well as the
corresponding infrastructure incident log.
Norwegian railway infrastructure is owned and managed by
a single Infrastructure Manager (IM). The IM is in charge of
the infrastructure, including monitoring infrastructure condi-
tion, incident handling and preventative and corrective main-
tenance. The operation of rolling stock on the infrastructure
is an open market, and currently there are 10 operators with a
license for traffic on the general infrastructure. The majority of
the infrastructure is a single-track infrastructure (94% single
track, 65% electrified), in a star-shaped network around the
capital. The topology and restrictions in single-track operation
means that adverse incidents and their corrective maintenance
is a important limiting factor for railway performance.
Infrastructure condition related events and work orders
reside in a traditional maintenance management system, whilst
the traffic data (i.e. system performance metrics) resides in
an event log which automatically samples the track-side train
detection in order to provide automatic second-resolution
punctuality information. Prior to the algorithm there were no
automatic allocation of delays, but only manual attribution.
This attribution was conducted by dispatchers, acting on infor-
mation conveyed by multiple sources (telephone, status logs,
etc.). In a pre-study we identified that this manual attribution
has obvious signs of batching, missing or obviously erroneous
attribution.
A. Set-up
We implemented the proposed method in R and applied
it to a large event log with more than 110 million events
describing block-level movements of trains that was obtained
from the traffic control system of the IM. Whilst being a
centrally controlled system, the event log data was of varying
quality which led to challenges similar to more traditional
business process mining scenarios. For example, some of the
tracks are still manually recorded. Such manual recording,
data transfer issue, and non-standard train traffic caused only
partially ordered events, swapped events, and several other
issues. We used knowledge on the actual infrastructure, i.e.,
the de-jure process model, to mitigate such problems similar
to conformance checking methods [6].
We obtained the incident-activity relation for 50 000 geo-
located incidents that were recorded in the maintenance man-
agement system by using the location of the incident and
lookup of the two closest stations to each side of the track.
We excluded incidents that evidently cannot affect the perfor-
mance of the process, e.g., incidents regarding the displays on
a station.
For the tuning of parameters (p0 and p1), we observed that
they are sensitive to large changes, however, small changes
in parameters do not change the result significantly. Thus, the
most important lesson when choosing these parameters is that
an occurrence of a delay is only slightly more probable under
an active incident, the relative difference here being more
important than the actual level on the probabilities.
We repeated the estimation 20 times for each incident using
the parameters indicated when presenting the method and com-
pared the results to evaluate whether the MCMC simulation
converged to a stable solution. Also, we investigating a large
number of trace-plots for all simulated parameters, that showed
convergence after the proposed number of iterations.
With repetitions, the computation took on average 6 minutes
for a single incident including data retrieval on a single
computation thread using standard server hardware. Note that
the calculation can be trivially parallelised which brings the
computation time down a level that is feasible in practice. The
results were written back to the data warehouse environment
of the IM for reporting and planning purposes.
B. Validation
In lack of a ground truth, we validated the results by
comparing the results to a database of delays that were man-
ually allocated to some incidents by train operators. Among
the process instances for which manual registration data was
available (only about 10% of the total data), we found that in
most cases (74%) our approach found some or even all the
delays manually allocated. Surprisingly, we found that in 36%
of the cases, we did not find any of the delay attributed to
incidents manually. We conducted an interview with a train
operator to clarify the difference. Several possible reasons for
this discrepancy were identified, which indicate the differences
are mainly due to data quality issues.
The primary reason is that, due to manual nature of the delay
registration and batch registration after a busy shift, sometimes
trains are registered that have been already delayed before
reaching the position of the incident (i.e., before executing
the process activity in question). Moreover, we found that
in some parts of the railway network the data quality of the
traffic registration is poor, which results in missing delay as
our proposal only takes the existing data into account. Another
reason are knock-on effects of delayed trains to other trains
in the railway network. These effects are not captured by this
proposal. In practice, we already integrated the knock-on effect
estimation approach presented in [7] for the single-track part
of the network. However, we consider this as out of scope for
this work.
Fig. 5. Accumulated delay for a specific part of the Norwegian railway
network as estimated based on the proposed method. The red bar in 2017
indicates the likely impact of incidents that were avoided by a preventive
maintenance system. The y-axis has been concealed due to confidentiality.
C. Results
There are many opportunities to use the process delay data
produced by our method. We present two use cases for the
data produced on the Norwegian railway traffic process.
In the first use case, we leverage the fact that it is possible
to automatically obtain a large amount of delay data and
that this data can be connected to a single resource in the
infrastructure. In this way, it is possible to get a reliable esti-
mate of the typical delay effect on the process that originates
from a specific failing resource. Recently, the Norwegian IM
has invested in preventive maintenance solutions for several
heavily used turnouts. Upgraded turnouts raise an alarm when
the equipment is likely to fail. We used data on these alarms,
which can be seen as prevented incidents, and the aggregated
median estimated process delay from the years beforehand
to quantify the delay-reduction effect of this investment in
predictive maintenance. The bar plot in Figure 5 shows the
estimated savings in term of prevented delay. Such insights
can be very valuable for evidence-based decision support.
In the the second use case, we used the unprecedented scale
of the delay database, in comparison to manual registration,
to open up new possibilities for exploratory data analysis and
reporting. For this purpose, we built an analysis dashboard that
can be used by the Norwegian IM. The dashboard has been
used in several workshops and is in ongoing use to identify re-
occurring issues with infrastructure and their effect on delays.
A distinct advantage of this fully data-driven approach is that
also the effect of many small impacts on process delay can be
quantified. Whereas the reasons for failures resulting in rare
large delays are well-known and can be manually investigated,
the effect of many small incidents is difficult to establish
but may well contribute more towards the overall customer
satisfaction.
Fig. 6. The analysis dashboard built on top of the delay estimation data.
V. RELATED WORK
Investigating the performance of processes using event logs
is one of the main tasks of process mining. A seminal work in
this regard is [8] which establishes the notion of alignments
to project reliable performance information extracted from
event logs on process models. In [9] the observed performance
of a process is captured with stochastic Petri nets. Decision
trees are used in [10] to analyse influential factors of business
process performance. Differently to our method, these factors
are assumed to be internal to the process and, thus, already
integrated with the process events. In [11] the correlation
between resource workload and processing speed in a process
is investigated based on an event log, however, no process
delay is quantified.
Another type of methods aims to predict the process perfor-
mance (e.g., remaining time, time to next activity). Like our
setting the work in [12] considers not only intra-case features
but takes a global view on all running cases. However, external
incidents are not considered. In [13] the process prediction
considers the influence of an environmental state, which is
similar to our use of the incident log as external factor but
with the aim to predict performance.
Besides these process-model-based approaches, there are
also several proposals to investigate the process performance
using visual analytics. A basic technique for comparing the
performance across several traces is the Dotted Chart [14]
in which events are visualised on a 2D scatter plot. Two
more recent proposal are the ProcessProfiler3D [15], in which
a general framework for 3D visualization of process perfor-
mance is proposed, and the Performance Spectrum Miner [16],
which focuses on visualizing performance variability over
time. While useful for exploratory analysis of causes for
process delay, it is not automatically attributing delay to
incidents.
Regarding our case study, in railway research the effect
of unplanned events such as infrastructure and rolling stock
malfunctions, passenger-related incidents or and inclement
weather is well known [17]. Interdependencies between in-
dividual delays and, so called, knock-on delays have been
studied [7], [18]. Also, there is some research that took a
process mining perspective on railway operations [3], [4], [19].
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no work trying
to quantify the effect of incidents on the overall delay of a
process based on events logs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The process-oriented view on event data in process mining
has led to a large number of methods that reveal insights about
process execution. However, there is relatively little work on
the impact that external factors have on processes even though
processes are seldom executed in isolation, and events that are
not directly related to the execution itself may have a large
impact on it. Such adverse incidents are often also registered,
but rarely in the same system, sometimes only manually, and
often with considerable uncertainty regarding the exact time
frame in which the incident had influence on the process. Thus,
it is difficult to quantify their impact on the process execution.
The main contribution of our work is a method for process
delay estimation caused by adverse incidents, which uses
process event logs and some minimal approximate information
on the incidents. We use Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
sampling to determine the most likely times at which the
influence of an incident on process performance started and
ended. Then, we use the estimated likelihoods to accumu-
late the overall delay, i.e., difference in performance from a
normal situation, that can be attributed to the incident. We
implemented and evaluated the method using a large database
of incidents and railway traffic control logs in the Norwe-
gian railway system between 2011 and 2018. The evaluation
showed that the method can reliably assign process delay
to incidents and thta it is useful for showing the effect of
investments in predictive maintenance. Finally, our method
puts focus on the overall effect of many minor infrastructure
failures individually resulting in small delays, which otherwise
would be difficult to establish.
There are several options to improve the proposed method
by addressing its limitations in future work.
First, we aim to apply the method to non-infrastructure
related processes. In the railway case the incident-activity
relation was easy to obtain, but in a general business context
it may be more difficult to determine this relation.
Second, multiple co-occurring incidents that affect the same
activity pose an issue for the proposed method both due
to possibly multi-modal delay distributions as well as the
difficulty to divide the delay properly. This, as well as, knock-
on and complex queuing effects are limitations of our method
and areas for future work. Regarding knock-on effects we did
initial research based on the method presented in [7]; however,
this method is not straightforward to apply it to the case of
generic business processes without additional assumptions.
Last, the Posterior distribution which is simulated using
MCMC uses a defined set of parameter values in the prior
distribution. These parameter values do not generalize to other
problems, and would need to be calibrated in each case. An
alternative that could be explored is to define a less informative
prior distribution, for instance using hyper distributions and
simulating parameters p0 and p1 as well, however this comes
with a high computational price.
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